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Over the last decade or so, many commentators have tried to make sense of the 
developments that characterize the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
crumbling of the Soviet Union. Many are the attempts; to paint a comprehensive 
picture of the overall developments commonly referred to as “globalization”, and the 
resulting visions are certainly varied. Common features nevertheless include 
increased economic interdependence, the emergence of a single world market in the 
fields of capital, finance and traded goods, and increased interconnectedness 
resulting from cheaper and faster transportation, the global reach of media and the 
new communication and information technology. What all this signals; is that 
globalization to no small degree is conceptualized in terms of a spatial 
reorganization including the decreasing importance of state borders, and of territory 
more generally. For instance, Kenichi Ohmae (1990) has brought forward the notion 
of an emerging “borderless world”, Richard Rosecrance (1999) celebrates what he 
calls “the emancipation from land” in the era of the “virtual state” and Richard 
O’Brien (1992) has launched the “End of Geography”-thesis, claiming that the 
forces of economic integration and technological innovations renders distances as 
well as geopolitical borders irrelevant. A recurring theme in these narratives of 
globalization is the increased mobility of people, capital, and information, often 
conceptualized as “flows”, across these ever more redundant borders.  
 
The limitations to this argument are evident when one turns to international 
migration and immigration controls, but these issues are conspicuously absent from 
most “mainstream” accounts of globalization. Whereas borders might be losing 
much of their previous military and economic relevance this development is 
paralleled by re-bordering practices in the immigration control field. States may be 




giving up sovereignty when it comes to precisely military and economic issues, but 
this coincides with a reassertion of the sovereign right to regulate who is to cross its 
borders. This is especially conspicuous in the increasingly restrictive control 
practices of the affluent states and regions in the world (Andreas 2000). Focusing on 
the more restrictive migration control practices, critics talk about “Fortress Europe” 
and “Tortilla Curtain” concerning the cases of Europe and the U.S. respectively, 
about a “Wall” being erected around the West (Andreas – Snyder et al: 2000), and of 
an emerging “global apartheid” (cf. Dalby 1999; Richmond 1994; Alexander 1996: 
Tesfahuney 2001).  
 
So, how are we to grasp this seeming contradiction in current developments? How 
can it be that migration controls persist and even are reinforced in an era which is 
usually described as de-territorializing?  How are migration controls to be 
conceptualized within the current order, and how is this related to power? In political 
science, migration control policy is usually analysed on the domestic level and 
considered the outcome of negotiations between actors with different interests. 
Typically, power is then reduced to the relative strengths of these actors. In my view, 
it is important also to interrogate into the role of migration control on the global 
level, and especially from a North-South perspective. I have therefore chosen to 
approach migration control from a slightly different angle by making use of concepts 
and theories from critical and postmodern geography as well as sociology. The main 
suggestion of this paper is that the simultaneous co-existence of de-bordering and re-
bordering processes can be understood if taking broader geopolitical imaginations 
into account.  
 
Firstly, however, I connect migration control to the broader geographical notion of 
mobility. Migration control policies legitimize and authorize certain types of 
mobility while others are effectively criminalized. Through empirical illustrations, it 
is argued that mobility rights – the access to legitimate movement as well as control 
over the terms of this movement – is unevenly distributed over the world, and that 
this is of vital importance since mobility is becoming “the main stratifying factor of 
our late-modern or post-modern times” (Bauman 1998: 2). The advantage with 
situating migration and migration control as one aspect of “mobility” is that it 
underscores that migration control cannot be studied in isolation from other ongoing 
processes, and it makes possible the comparison between different sorts of 
movement. Understanding mobility as a power factor also inserts migration control 
into global power relations that is often absent from political science texts on 
migration control. It is believed that the organization of space through migration 
control not only reflects global power relations, but also reinforces them (cf. Delaney 
2002).  
 
As Brah et al (1997: 7) point out, “it is important always to be aware of power-
relations both as they are played out in the social sphere and as they are embedded 
within the power-knowledge system which our ways of imagining, conceptualizing 
and theorizing construct”. In the second part I try to connect the differentiated 
mobility rights to geopolitical conceptualizations, which are understood as 




inherently political (cf. Dalby 1999: 135). It is argued that there are two main ways 
of understanding space that in some ways contradict each other but nevertheless are 
alive and well in popular imagination. The first one is the globalist imagination of 
de-territorialization and unbounded space, of “space as flows”, shortly accounted for 
in the introduction of this paper. The second is the essentialist imagination of space 
as ruptured and divided into bounded entities, of “space as places”. This is an 
imagination of nationalism, of defensible places, and of having a “natural” home in 
the world. It is suggested that these two understandings of space are called upon in 
turn, that they are used to legitimize different sorts of action, and that they together 
tend to weaken the already weak.  
 
This paper is delimited in some important respects. While I do criticize migration 
control measures, I do not offer a comprehensive account of the politico-normative 
debate on this issue1. Furthermore, the empirical evidence used to illustrate this 
mainly theoretical investigation primarily consists of European and other Western 
asylum and migration policies and their consequences. Other parts of the world also 
employ migration restrictions that surely can be just as criticized, but these are not 
covered in this paper. Moreover, since I am trying to gain an understanding of state 
policies my perspective is necessarily ”from above”. My focus is hence the 
representations of space prominent in a Western context. The way people on a local 
basis react to, transform and resist these discursive imaginings could certainly 
provide material for many important and interesting studies but it is not the subject 
of this paper.  
 
Mobility and power 
 
Alongside the emerging planetary dimensions of business, finance, trade and 
information flows, a ‘localizing’, space-fixing process in set in motion. Between 
them, the two closely interconnected processes sharply differentiate the existential 
conditions of whole populations and of various segments of each one of the 
populations. What appears as globalization for some means localization for others; 
signalling a new freedom for some, upon many others it descends as an uninvited 
and cruel fate. Mobility climbs to the rank of the uppermost among the coveted 
values – and the freedom to move, perpetually a scarce and unequally distributed 
commodity, fast becomes the main stratifying factor of our late-modern or 
postmodern times (Bauman 1998: 2).  
 
There is no denying that the globalization processes mentioned in the beginning of 
this paper really are taking place. However, we must be careful not to generalize 
about their effects. According to Paolini (1997) there has been a general tendency in 
most accounts of globalization to assume (explicitly or implicitly) that these 
processes tend towards homogeneity. To counter this, there is a need to be attentive 
to the social differentiation in the experience of the ongoing developments – to take 
                                              
1 This is a matter of intense normative dispute. See, for instance, Carens (1987); Cole (2000); 
Dummett (2001); Gibney (1986); Walzer (1983); Barry – Goodin (eds.) (1992). 




into account the “power-geometries of time-space” (Massey 1999; cf. Massey 1994: 
149). The decreased importance of territory and state borders, so central in many 
accounts of the spatial reorganization of globalization, is really only one possible 
experience of ongoing processes. This is because the social relations of space are 
experienced differently by people and groups holding different positions in relation 
to it (Massey 1994: 3).  
 
What is suggested here is that mobility is a question of power, and that it becomes 
increasingly so as a consequence of the tendency towards globalization. According 
to Bauman, all known societies have been stratified, and one way to tell one society 
from another is by the dimensions along which it stratifies its members. In our 
world, mobility is becoming the most important stratifying dimension. It is the 
differences in mobility rights, conceived of as the access to legitimate movement as 
well as control over the terms of this movement, that determine the new polarization. 
In Bauman’s words: “[m]obility and its absence designate the new, late-modern or 
postmodern polarization of social conditions. The top of the new hierarchy is 
exterritorial; its lower ranges are marked by varying degrees of space constraints” 
(Bauman 1998: 105).  
 
Underlying this is the asymmetry in mobility rights between capital and labour; 
“[o]ne of the most notable, yet least noticed characteristics of the inequality within 
the current type of globalization (Massey 1999: 37)”. Capital, in the forms of 
investment, financial transactions and traded goods, is moving ever more freely over 
the globe and is encouraged to do so under the sign of “free trade”. Moreover, the 
free trade regime is institutionally manifest in the WTO, and there have also at least 
been attempts at establishing a multilateral forum to deregulate investments through 
the MAI-treaty. However, a multilateral forum to do away with the barriers to the 
free trade in labour has so far not been established – although this would probably 
expand the world economy more than the deregulation of any other good on the 
WTO agenda (Rodrik 2002). As Mike Haynes has aptly noted: “in these terms 
labour power is not a commodity like any other – it is inferior to the tin of beans, the 
machine, the dollar bill” (1999: 26). Compared to the movement of capital, the 
movement of labour is much more regulated and controlled. People are, of course, 
still moving in search for better opportunities, but they are often obliged to do it 
illegally and take on the considerable risks associated with this type of movement.  
 
What is ”new”, according to Bauman (1998: 9ff), is that the mobility of capital 
implies unheard-of possibilities to exercising power from a distance and to shed 
responsibility for consequences for those at the “upper end” of the mobility stratum. 
At the receiving end, this means decreased power to control even the locality from 
which these less mobile people have little chance of escaping. In terms of North-
South relations this is especially evident in the power over national economies that is 
exercised by predominantly “Northern” institutions such as the IMF and the World 
Bank through structural adjustment programs, as a consequence of “Southern” 
countries’ debt burdens.  
 




It is important to keep in mind the unequal relationship between capital and labour in 
terms of mobility. For the rest of this paper, however, I will primarily focus on the 
differential mobility rights of people. As stated before, people are positioned 
differently in relation to the mobility dimension. However, these positions are not 
solely attributable to class relations, but are also a product of other power relations, 
such as gender and race. Here, I will look at the social differentiation of mobility, 
which relates directly to migration and migration control. In the following, I will 
present a (necessarily brief) overview of mobility rights.  
 
Stratification of mobility rights 
If it is true that mobility is becoming the most important stratifying dimension in 
global relations today, and that different mobility rights is the sign of a new 
polarization – then it becomes vital to figure out at what positions along the mobility 
dimension different groups are located. Moreover, from a political science 
perspective it is of special importance to trace how different institutional practices 
affect this same dimension. Migration policies of various kinds are certainly central 
here, but cannot – as stated above – be seen in isolation from other policies, 
especially those connected to the global economy. Below, I will only offer a very 
brief empirical overview, which should by no means be taken as comprehensive.  
“Mobility rights” relates directly to access to movement (cf. Hyndman 2004), but it 
is also about control, about power in relation to the terms of that movement. Some 
are more in charge of the flows and the movements, while others are effectively 
imprisoned by it. Perhaps mobility rights are best thought of as a continuum with the 
most and the least mobile at the endpoints. Very simplified, however, there are three 
main positions that groups and individuals can occupy in terms of mobility (cf. 
Massey 1994: 149f). 
 
First, at the upper end of the strata are those doing the moving and communicating 
and who are in some way in a position of control in relation to it: the ones doing the 
investments and currency transactions and who are able to turn this new freedom of 
mobility to their advantage – the cosmopolitan “international jet-setters” (Massey 
1994: 149) or “club-class migrants” (Brah et al 1997: 6). These are often 
businessmen or high-level professionals, employed within the core sectors of the 
world economy. This position also includes others from the Western elites, such as 
journalists and academics – that is, those who write about globalization (Massey 
1994: 149f). However, it is important to note that even within this privileged group 
people travel with various degrees of ease. Top academics of colour are probably 
more likely than their white colleagues to meet with suspicion in customs and 
passport controls, as has been recounted by bell hooks (cf. Tesfahuney 1998).  
 
Apart from Western elites, citizens of Third World countries who have managed to 
get work permits in rich countries because of their professional skills also have a 
strong position in relation to the mobility dimension – at least as long as their skills 
are still asked for. Countering the general trend towards more restrictive policies 
towards low-skilled labour migration in the rich countries, this sort of migration has 
increased over the last decade, which has led Nigel Harris (2002: 41) to conclude 




that ”the underlying principle of this approach is that the world of migration is only 
for the professional and highly skilled, a privilege for the elite. Those counted as 
unskilled are to be tied, like serfs, to the soil of their homeland”.  
 
The international jet-set of today is preceded by the elites of yesterday. The rich and 
the powerful seem always to have been travelling more than the rest of the 
population, and borders have not to any significant degree inhibited their movement. 
Bauman (1998: 10) talks about “the absentee landlords of yore”, who were notorious 
for neglecting the populations who maintained them. The sole interest these elites 
held in the land they owned, and often left behind, was limited to living off the 
surplus it produced. At times, these elites also created a trans-border culture of their 
own, having more in common with elites across borders than with the rest of the 
population inside them. Not only was travelling reserved for the privileged elites, it 
was at times also considered an ideal. In Enlightenment thinking, travelling was 
thought of as contributing to education and moral refinement. In Rousseau’s thought, 
travelling was a requirement for knowledge and the ability to think ‘universally’. 
The ever resident people, by contrast, spent their entire life in the same village, knew 
nothing about the surrounding world and could therefore not even properly know 
themselves. Since they had nothing to compare with, and thought their own lifestyle 
was the only conceivable one, these people were to him “barbarians” compared to 
the moral superiority of the traveller (Jonsson 1995: 45f). This way of thinking 
echoes the way young Westerners are encouraged to travel in order to reach self-
realization by getting to know themselves as well as distant peoples and places, 
whereas most of the world’s population have no possibility of living this ideal. Now, 
like in the days of Rousseau, being able to travel freely seems to be a privilege of the 
well-to-do. To repeat, what is “new”, according to Bauman (1998: 9ff), is that the 
mobility of capital implies unheard-of possibilities to exercising power from a 
distance and to shed responsibility for consequences.  
 
In the second position are the groups of people who do the physical movement but 
who are not in charge of it in the same way. Most obvious here is the heterogeneous 
group of “illegal” or “undocumented” immigrants, comprised of people who may or 
may not have legitimate asylum reasons for their movement.  
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, all Western European countries adopted policies 
to put an end to labour migration. It is probably true that this forced some “economic 
migrants” into the asylum channel, since that was the only one open for legal entry 
(Koser 2001: 60). In turn, this has fed the suspicion that asylum-seekers are really 
“only” economic migrants. They are often frowned upon and do not seldom 
experience discrimination and racism. In any case, the tighter asylum policies have 
in their turn forced also desperate people with “real” asylum reasons to enter Europe 
illegally together with others (Morrison – Crosland 2001), thereby often laying their 
lives in the hands of smugglers.  
 
Every year large numbers of people get killed when they illegally try to enter 
Europe. A Dutch organization calculated that 1574 people died between 1993 and 




2000 – drowned in rivers or at sea, frozen to death or suffocated in the back of 
trucks. This just concerns documented cases and should probably be seen as a 
considerable underestimation. According to other estimations, the sum of deaths is 
the double or triple (Stalker 2001: 52ff; 130f). Still, many people manage to get in, 
and there are probably around 3 million undocumented immigrants in the EU area 
(ibid: 11). Many observations show that there is a demand for this particular 
workforce precisely because of their undocumented status and lack of legal rights. 
These people often end up in the secondary labour market where they hold the so-
called 3D-jobs (Dirty, Difficult and Dangerous), often in agriculture or construction, 
which are rejected by the demanding and more educated native workforces (Stalker 
2000). It is important to note that these people are important economic contributors, 
not only to the host economy, but to the sending economy as well. In Mexico, for 
instance, remittances from workers are the third largest source of foreign exchange. 
World net inflow of remittances to developing countries in 2002 was estimated to 
around $U.S. 80 billion, not counting the informal flows. This is 2-3 times more than 
total overseas development assistance (Ramamurthy 2003: 10). 
 
The work that women migrants perform requires special mentioning here. Domestic 
and sexual services are probably the most notable. Agathangelou (2002) claims that 
an important feature of globalization is precisely the sexualization and 
commodification of female migrant labour and the “accelerating exchange of money 
for bodies”. According to her, domestic and sexual services are central to capital 
accumulation and the demand for these services is intimately connected to the 
emerging transnational class of professionals. An odd but perhaps telling example of 
women migrants is that the Philippine state has started “mail-order-bride”-
companies to facilitate and rationalize the export of young women to men in rich 
countries. These women send home about $US 1 billion each year from the Gulf 
nations, Europe and the U.S. and are therefore important contributors to the national 
economy (Khosravi 2004).  
 
A lot of the joint efforts of European states aim at ending human smuggling and 
preventing illegal immigration. But it is likely that illegal immigration will continue 
as long as there is demand for this work. Probably, the only thing that would end this 
sort of movement is a serious recession and high rates of unemployment in Europe 
(Harris 2002: 50). What concerns human smuggling, as awful and inhumane this 
business may be, it too will probably continue as long as there is demand for its 
service. According to Kyle and Koslowski (2001), the smuggling is exacerbated by a 
variety of problems such as social inequality, state corruption, and ethnic and gender 
discrimination. But it is also connected to the differentiated mobility rights: “human 
smuggling is not so much a disease but a symptom of the enormous contemporary 
disparities in the legitimate mobility of the world’s peoples during, ironically, the 
historical apex of mutual global awareness and interconnectedness”(ibid: 23).  
 
So, in contrast to the former one, this group of migrants travel illegally and at their 
own risk, are not seldom met with suspicion, and sometimes arrested and deported 
upon arrival (cf. Bauman 1998: 89).   





The third position is comprised of those who do not do any cross-border moving at 
all, and who are more or less imprisoned by the same processes that allow other 
people (and production factors) to move. European states employ a variety of 
measures to limit immigration of the “unwanted”, among them a more assertive 
control of the external border. The kind of policies that most obviously restrict 
movement, are however, the “remote control” measures.  
 
Zolberg (1999) uses the term “remote control” to denote immigration policies 
designed to deter immigration by regulating departure at or near the point of origin. 
The origin of this system of control is the elaboration and universalization of a visa 
regime. By requiring visas, the control procedure is located in the prospective 
immigrants’ home country, which greatly diminishes the number of people who will 
turn up at the actual border. In recent years the system of remote control policies has 
become much more complex. Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) list a range of such 
activities, aimed at preventing departure: information campaigns to deter potential 
migrants, visa requirements, carrier sanctions, liaisons with foreign control 
authorities, physical interception of people travelling with fraudulent documents, and 
the establishment of “buffer zones” beyond national borders. There are also more 
“indirect” measures to hinder people from leaving: development aid, foreign direct 
investment, and the reduction of trade barriers (Brochmann 1999: 14) sometimes 
serve this purpose, especially when these “goods” are granted only in exchange for 
the tightening of the barriers to exit.  
 
A major problem with remote control policies is precisely their defining feature –
their aim of preventing departure. This is perhaps especially grave when it comes to 
asylum seekers – because to get classified as a refugee a person has to cross an 
international border and apply for asylum, and these policies aim at preventing 
people from doing so. This is why this type of policies has been severely criticized 
by human rights organizations, as well as journalists and academics.  
 
When it comes to visa requirements, it is quite obvious that persecuted people are 
often not in a good position for obtaining visas. Many times, they are lucky if they 
have passports at all (Dummett 2001: 125). Nevertheless, European countries have 
often used visa requirements as an instrument to reduce the number of asylum 
seekers in the midst of a refugee-generating crisis2. With the harmonization of the 
Schengen countries’ asylum and immigration policy, member countries increasingly 
have coordinated their visa requirements. At the moment people from 133 countries 
in the world needs visa to enter an EU country. Most of them are located in Asia, 
Africa, Latin America and the Middle East (UD 2004).  
 
                                              
2 Great Britain, for instance, demanded visas from Iranians and Sri Lankan people in 1985. Sweden, 
for its part, introduced visa requirements for people from Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1993 (Hammar 
1999: 182). This severely diminished the flows - from a total of 84000 asylum-seekers in 1992, to 
34000 in 1993. 




Another type of “remote control” policy that has received a lot of criticism is carrier 
sanctions – that is, the fining of transport companies (notably airlines) that carry 
individuals lacking documents necessary for admission. With carrier sanctions, 
airlines officers are obliged to make sure that each passenger possesses sufficient 
documents for admission before bordering, and also – often but not always – that 
s/he has enough funds for a return ticket. Apart from the fact that a central state 
matter is thus carried out by private actors, it is also a way to execute the 
implementation of immigration control near the source of origin. Which – once 
again –will also prevent many “real refugees” from arriving3.  
 
This third group of non-travellers is not only comprised of would-be refugees. 
Would-be labour migrants who are not allowed to move in search for work, and who 
do not have the resources to travel illegally are also included here. Following 
Bauman’s argument, these people are essentially powerless because in the era of 
time-space compression, immobility is the mark of the excluded. Not only are they 
barred from movement, they may also have lost control over their local affairs, for 
instance in the economic sense developed above (cf. Bauman 1998: 113).  
 
This crude list is by no means complete, so the categories above should be 
considered merely illustrative. There is a variety of reasons for movement, and thus 
potentially many categories of migrants that are not accounted for. There is also a 
great deal of regulations controlling people’s movement which are not taken into 
account. Restrictions on third country nationals to move within the EU and the 
different restrictions on movement that the older EU countries have imposed on 
citizens of the new member states are two examples. Also, there is a specific form of 
immobility caused by the stricter immigration policies – those who manage to get 
inside illegally tend to stay inside since they risk not being successful if they try it 
again. Moreover, some groups of people are not easily placed along this mobility 
continuum. How is one, for instance, to place ordinary non-elite citizens of the 
western world? It could be argued that their movement, like that of citizens of less-
privileged states, is conditioned across the axes of race (Tesfahuney 1998; Gilmore 
2002; Delaney 2002), gender and class (Massey 1994; Hyndman 2004), that most of 
them do not have the means for mobility nor are in a position of control over that 
movement. On the other hand, they do enjoy considerable privileges as a result of 
having had the fortune to be born in the “right” country. According to Carens 
(1987), this accidental birth situation gives a person undeserved privileges that are 
irreconcilable with liberal philosophy. Citizenship in any of the Western 
democracies is to him “…the modern equivalence of feudal privilege – an inherited 
status that greatly enhances one’s life chances”. Returning to the mobility as power 
argument, it can be stated that citizenship in a rich country gives power in relation to 
                                              
3 In 2000, 3651 people arrived to Arlanda airport in Stockholm without proper passports and 
documentations. Of these, 569 were granted asylum and around 1800 were allowed to stay in the 
country for humanitarian reasons. Less than 30% had their asylum applications turned down and 
were deported (Wirtén 2002: 17). With carrier sanctions, these would most likely not have arrived at 
all. 
 




those who do not have it. The employment of exploitable undocumented workers, 
the possibility to economize by buying the hence cheaply produced products, and the 
possibility to buy a “mail-order-bride” are some instances when this relation of 
power is most evident. Because of the development towards more stratified mobility, 
the holding of a citizenship or a work permit in the rich western world becomes even 
more valuable. Khosravi (2004) even suggests that the ownership of a citizenship or 
a work permit in the rich western world today might be as important a class question 
as the conventional ownership of capital.  
 
Not denying the importance of class, gender and racial factors, what concerns me 
most here is how mobility is shaped by institutional practices that manage the access 
to mobility. And as such, there are not many institutional barriers to the movement 
of ordinary citizens of Western countries. Western people have the (at least formal) 
possibility to travel almost completely as they wish, and can expect to be welcomed 
practically everywhere. Also, a great deal of migration actually takes place within 
the Western world. What concerns the European Union, freedom of movement for 
citizens is guaranteed and motivated with reference to human rights. Extra-EU 
migration, by contrast, is severely controlled and guarded by the opposite philosophy 
of internal security (Joppke 1998: 21). So, these “ordinary citizens” definitely belong 
at the upper end of the mobility dimension.  
 
One thing to be remembered from this section is the unequal relationship between 
capital and labour in terms of mobility. Whereas the first is allowed to move around 
the globe with few restrictions, the second is reduced, managed and controlled. The 
international migration that still remains is clearly segregated and mobility is 
unequally distributed over the world according to nationality, class, gender and race. 
Even those whose mobility is unwanted keep moving, of course, but are controlled 
and often have to do it illegally. There are two contrary tendencies at work here; the 
consequences of economic globalization in its neoliberal guise increase pressure on 
people to move in search for work, yet the intensification of global market forces are 
accompanied by greater restrictions on this movement. Whereas mobility has 
perhaps always been a class signifier, what is “new” is the increased possibilities for 
those “high-up” to shed consequences for their actions, thus leaving the “low-
downs” behind. The latter has of course no such possibility since their movement is 
restricted and controlled4. The differentiated access to, and control over mobility is 
thus not only about unequal distribution, but also has the consequences of weakening 
the already weak (Massey 1994: 150).  
 
To further the understanding of how such a differentiated system of mobility rights 
can persist in an “era of globalization”, I will now discuss the two main geopolitical 
imaginations that influence and shape thought as well as political action.   
                                              
4 Perhaps the most ironic illustration of western business interests in relation to movement 
restrictions is the arms sale to countries from which refugees are later sometimes barred. It has been 
estimated that 65% of asylum seekers coming to Sweden 1983-1994 were from the ten countries in 
war to which Sweden exported arms during the same period (Tesfahuney 2001: 194).  
 




Two geopolitical imaginations 
Our understandings and imaginations of the world guide and shape our thoughts and 
actions. When it comes to geopolitics, there are two especially influential 
imaginations (Massey 1999). The first one – “space as flows” is already introduced 
in the beginning of this paper. Here, I will merely focus on the critique of this vision. 
The second imagination is the essentialist understanding of the relationship between 
people and places. What is suggested is that these contradictory imaginations 
legitimize different types of actions, and it is argued that the position of a group on 
the mobility dimension is (at least partly) connected to the interplay between these 
different imaginations or discourses.  
 
Globalization – “space as flows” 
‘Globalization’ as a vision of unbounded space and uninhibited mobility is one of 
the most powerful terms in our geographical and social imaginations. Like all other 
descriptions of reality, the “globalization vision” is certainly a political one. Not 
denying that the processes described above really are taking place, critics claim that 
as a comprehensive description it is exaggerated and ethnocentric. For instance, 
Paolini (1997: 42) argues that proponents of this vision tend to concentrate on 
certain developments in the developed world and assume that these processes are 
occurring in a similar fashion elsewhere as well. “Like most theory of a 
predominantly Western orientation, it picks up certain processes and developments 
pertaining to the First World and magnifies them beyond their specifically Western 
context”. An example of this is the idea that globalization entails a stretching of 
social relations over vast distances, thus bringing different peoples and cultures 
closer to each other. This mirrors a Western experience of “the rest” arriving in “the 
West” as something rather new (Hall 1992a). For formerly colonized societies, 
however, this meeting with the exotic stranger cannot seem very new. In his 
overview of how the Third World is conceptualized within the hegemonic discourses 
on globalization, Paolini clams that the implicit assumption usually is that these 
processes are homogenous and comprehensive (1997: 69). The Third World is either 
omitted from these accounts of globalization, or it is included on someone else’s 
terms (cf. Persaud 2002). Certainly, societies in the Third World are affected by the 
processes in question, but the reception and the consequences of them are not 
uniform over the globe. One of the problems with this vision of globalization, then, 
is that it only mirrors the reality of a small minority of the world’s population but is 
presented as a neutral, objective truth. What we have here, then, is a problem of 
positionality in relation to power/knowledge, in that globalization as “space as 
flows” is premised on developments that are especially conspicuous in one specific 
part of the world, in contrast to its global aspirations. Moreover, this might at least in 
part be related to the fact that those who have formulated the globalization vision – 
western academics and journalists – themselves are positioned on the upper level of 
the mobility dimension.  
 
Although globalization in this vision is often depicted as a spatial reorganization, 
Doreen Massey (1997) claims that this vision is not truly spatialized. Because of a 




lack of specification and a lack of analysis of its causes (apart from technological 
determinism), this version of economic globalization is often considered inevitable. 
And in this perceived inevitability it has become something similar to a “grand 
narrative” of our days. What this does, among other things, is to imagine spatial 
differences as temporal. For instance, the countries which are not yet drawn into the 
community of free trade and instantaneous communication are often thought of as 
lagging behind, eventually having to surrender to the forces of globalization: the 
possibilities of alternative developments are not considered an option. In this way it 
is reminiscent of modernity’s story of progress which had the same aura of 
inevitability and also signified a victory of time over space. In this “story”, it was 
western progress and development which were celebrated. Failing to understand 
non-Western societies, and the inability to imagine difference in other societies as 
potentially leading to different types of developments, all societies were thought of 
as progressing along a single continuum, divided into a series of stages with the 
European model on top. Other (colonized) societies were thus considered 
“backward” as compared to the West. This provided the impetus for civilization 
missions, since it was thought the moral responsibility of those at a more advanced 
stage to provide assistance to those lagging behind. By providing a negative mirror-
image of the West the imagined “Other” also contributed to the production of 
Western identity (cf. Hall 1992b: 312ff; Jonsson 1995: 105). This way, spatial 
difference was reduced to temporal difference in the story of modernity. 
Simultaneously, other “temporalities” – other imaginations of progress and 
development, for instance – were also precluded. This has its counterpart in the way 
“globalization” (in its Western form) is often imagined as inevitably progressing and 
including ever more regions and countries. According to Massey, what is often 
forgotten is that economic globalization can take a variety of different forms, and 
that economics itself is a discourse. This has to be remedied by taking geographical 
differences seriously. To envision different kinds of developments, other 
temporalities – there must be space.  
 
Apart from its ethnocentrism and its lack of true spatiality then, this vision is also 
political in that it legitimizes certain political and economic actions in spite of its 
limited anchoring in reality. It corresponds well to the current ‘free trade discourse’, 
a discourse which is predominantly produced in the developed “North” part of the 
globe and embodied in international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank 
and the WTO. The understanding of the world as a future global trading place also 
legitimizes the various measures associated with the imposition of structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) on countries in the “South”. These measures include 
among other things export orientation, decreased public spending and privatizations, 
and have had well-known effects of social polarization and increased hardship for 
the already poor, especially women. This vision of globalization also has had effects 
in the “North”, like the cut-down of social welfare programs and the surrendering of 
state control over the markets of capital and finance, often explained by the need to 
become more competitive because of the pressures from globalization. So, this 
vision of globalization is both political to its content and to its effects. In the words 
of Doreen Massey: “This vision of neo-liberal globalization, then, is not so much a 




description of how the world is, as an image in which the world is being made. But 
this vision once having been raised, and installed as hegemonic, provides the context 
for the actions of others. In particular, it provides the excuse for inaction (1999: 
36).”  
  
Geopolitics of belonging – “space as places” 
The second influential geopolitical imagination has its roots in the process of 
modernization. One of the consequences of modernity was that the nation-state form 
of governance got universalized across the globe. But the nation-state was only one 
aspect of a more general way of imagining cultures and societies, and their relation 
to space. Space, in this vision, is considered as divided, ruptured, and consisting of 
separate bounded components – of places. Places, in turn, are thought of as firmly 
bounded, fixed and unchanging locations with their own internally generated 
authentic identity. (Massey 1999: 29f; cf. Dwyer – Jones III 2000). Furthermore, this 
“essentialist” understanding of space (Brun 2001) is accompanied by an essentialist 
understanding of culture as separate and discrete entities corresponding to particular 
places (Olwig - Hastrup 1997). In this geopolitical imagination, there is supposedly 
an essential relationship between people and places, so that everyone has a “natural” 
home in the world. This conception of space as divided is connected to “having 
roots” and of belonging – of belonging to a particular place and having that place 
belonging to oneself. It is an imagination of defensible places, of the right of “local 
people” to their own “local places”. In the strictest form, this imagination allows for 
no places to be “multicultural”. 
 
Perhaps this understanding of places and cultures as bounded and homogenous can 
be thought of as a way of bringing intellectual order into an otherwise disorderly 
world (Olwig – Hastrup 1997), perhaps it can be related to a greater scheme of 
modernist/”white” epistemology (Dwyer – Jones III 2000); perhaps it can be 
explained by reference to object-relations theory (Massey 1994; Sibley 1995). In any 
case, it is astonishing that this view, establishing a “natural” connection between 
people, territory and political organization, took hold under a period when millions 
of people were engaged in Euro-American and intra-European migration, as well as 
the slave trade, in an era “when the facts so massively spoke of the mobility of 
people, the mutability of boundaries, the mongrelarity of nations and the specular 
artificiality of the state” (Dillon 1999: 109). Taking account of the massive amount 
of people who for generations have had to move or flee, or who have been forcibly 
removed because of slave trade or colonization and sometimes more than once, the 
somewhat nostalgic idea of having a home-place where one belongs is certainly not 
based on universal experience (Massey 1994: 166). In spite of reality, then, this 
imagination is still very influential5.  
                                              
5 The essentialist conception of place and culture has long been questioned within various 
disciplines, and the links between people, identities and places have been de-naturalized 
theoretically (cf. Olwig-Hastrup 1997). Massey (1994), for instance understands space and place as 
created through social relations. Space is the simultaneous coexistence of social interrelations at all 
spatial scales, from the most local to the most global level. Place is then a particular articulation of 
those relations, a particular moment in these networks of social relations. The place (or the identity 




This specific geopolitical imagination works in two directions. Since it normalizes 
the construction of localities as belonging to the people who “have roots” there, it 
legitimizes the state’s right to control the movement over their territory. As Helga 
Leitner (1995: 261) observes, “debates over immigration generally start with the 
premise that every state has the right to control the admission of foreigners”. This is 
considered central to state sovereignty, to the extent that Torpey, travestying Weber, 
suggests that the state should be defined as the agency claiming “monopoly on the 
legitimate means of movement” (Torpey 2000). So it seems that whereby former 
central state powers, such as control over the national economy, are relinquished 
with reference to the “space as flows” imagination, the preservation of the right to 
control the movement of people resonates with the imagination of the essentialist 
notion of space as places.  
 
While the territory of the receiving state is constructed as belonging to its citizens, 
this imagination simultaneously constructs others – asylum-seekers, migrants, 
citizens of other states – as belonging some place else. Brun (2001) notes that the 
essentialist understanding of the relationship between people and places have far-
reaching consequences for the way solutions to the ‘refugee problem’ have been 
formulated. For instance, when refugees are regarded as ‘out of place’ and 
‘uprooted’, their temporariness at the place of arrival is stronger. In this perspective, 
where everyone belongs to a certain place, a refugee can never belong to the host 
territory. The only solution is then to end their refugee status, either by repatriation – 
forced or voluntary – or by assimilation, whereby the refugee is supposed to give up 
his or her old identity and absorb the customs and culture of the host territory. 
Another manifestation of the attitude towards refugees as being ‘uprooted’ is the 
“right to remain at home strategy”. This policy strategy has accompanied the closing 
of the borders to the Western world, and it represents an interest to assist displaced 
people within their country of origin. Because if people are thought of as having a 
natural place to live, then the best way of helping them is as close as possible to their 
place of origin. There are risks connected to this strategy because people will be 
closer to the reason for displacement (conflicts, environmental disasters etc.). It also 
conceals the displacement problem to Northern publics since people become 
displaced within their own countries. This strategy has caused an increase in the 
number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the 1990s.  
 
The essentialist notion of belonging and place is not necessarily uniform in terms of 
its representations. There is a tendency within Western discourse to regard other 
cultures and peoples as more place-bound (Olwig – Hastrup 1997). This is connected 
to the common assumption to regard non-Western people as somehow closer to 
nature. Non-Western cultures are often thought of as closely adapted to their 
particular environment. Westerners are usually pictured in their own representations 
                                                                                                                                          
of the place) is formed out of interrelations, both present in the same locality as well as 
interrelations stretching beyond the location itself. As Brun (2001) has observed, with this 
theoretical understanding of place, it makes no sense of talking about migrants and refugees as 
“uprooted” or “out of place”. Also, de-naturalizing the link between place and people also means 
that no one has a natural right to any place.  




as more mobile in terms of culture; the word “ethnic” is used about other cultures, 
not ours. Sibley (1995: 26f) believes that the association with nature is a general 
feature of the classification of beings by dominant groups, and that it is associated 
with the history of colonialism, the rise of science and the growth of capitalism. Not 
only colonized people and African slaves have been subject to this association, but 
also women, Romani people and “native” groups. When the relationship between 
“us” and “them” is implicitly formulated as the relationship between “culture” and 
“nature” this is an indication of the dominants’ view of the relationship as 
asymmetrical. While the projection of a certain group as closer to nature entails 
exoticization and romanticization it also serves to dehumanize. Because if they are a 
part of nature, they are also less than human. Although the association of non-
Westerners with nature was certainly more pronounced in the colonial days, when it 
legitimated the treatment of people as less than human and/or legitimated civilization 
missions since these people in their primitive state needed saving,  remnants of this 
imagination still seems to live on. The ethnologist Oscar Pripp (2001) notes, for 
instance, that within Swedish society the ethnic groups that are laterally positioned 
with the Swedish majority in terms of socio-economic position as well as in terms of 
political influence are other westerners. Non-westerners are inferiorly located along 
a hierarchical scale. The further down a specific group is located, it tends to be 
increasingly regarded by the majority population as homogenous and its members’ 
behaviour as determined by their culture. Countering this imagination of non-
westerners as more place- and culture-bound, Stuart Hall points out that societies in 
the periphery always have been open to Western influence. “The idea that these are 
‘closed’ places – ethnically pure, culturally traditional, undisturbed until yesterday 
by the ruptures of modernity – is a Western fantasy about ‘otherness’: a ‘colonial 
fantasy’ maintained about the periphery by the West, which tends to like its natives 
‘pure’ and its exotic places ‘untouched’ (1992a: 305).  
 
The geopolitical imagination “space as places” is supportive of the idea that the host 
or receiving country has the right to retain control over the movement over its 
territory. By representing newcomers as “naturally” belonging somewhere else, 
migration control is further legitimized. The suggestion here is that the construction 
of non-Westerners as relatively more place-bound also reinforces or naturalizes the 
control of the movement from these parts of the world (which also happens to be the 












This paper started out as an interrogation into the persistence and reinforcement of 
migration controls in a world commonly characterised as globalizing. Indeed, the 
ever more restrictive migration control regime seems paradoxical when the dominant 
geopolitical description emphasizes de-bordering practices and the decreased 
importance of territory. To gain an understanding of this seeming contradiction, I 
have furthered the idea of mobility as an increasingly important power resource in 
our time. Access to, and control over mobility has been shown to be unevenly 
distributed over the world according to nationality, race, gender and class. If 
mobility is considered a power resource, then migration control has to be understood 
from a global power perspective. Underscoring the inequality of mobility rights is 
the asymmetrical relation between mobile capital and the relative fixity of labour. 
This asymmetry reflects two different and contradictory geopolitical imaginations of 
the world; “space as flows” and “space as places”. What is suggested here is that 
these understandings contradict each other, yet are equally strong. Or rather, they are 
called upon in different contexts, thus legitimizing different things: whereas the first 
legitimizes measures such as the cut-down in welfare spending and the restructuring 
of Southern economies, the second justifies the control of immigration. Because of 
the co-existence of these two differing imaginations, it becomes possible to argue for 
trade liberalizations and immigration restrictions at the same time. It is also 
important to note that different people have different access to these imaginations. 
When Southern people call upon the first one about the right to free movement, it is 
automatically rejected.  
 
Most importantly, the co-existence of these different understandings seems to 
weaken the already weak (cf. Massey 1999). Poor people in the Third World are not 
only increasingly “localized” by restrictive immigration and asylum policies, but 
also tend to lose control over their localities as economic globalization has justified 
the restructuring of their economies. The opening-up of these economies to foreign 
investment and the fixity of people also allows for the provision of cheap labour to 
foreign industries. Simultaneously, and on the other way around, the parallel 
geopolitical imaginations work to the benefit for the already privileged.  
 
Still, there is no saying that this “system” will persist indefinitely. For instance, there 
are now negotiations within the WTO to multilaterally deregulate the movement of 
labour within the “Mode 4” of the GATS treaty. Another example is the more 
comprehensive approach towards an international agenda for migration management 
embodied in the “Berne initiative”. This work surely proceeds slowly and in any 
case only concerns certain occupations and services. However it might be that in the 
long run the regulation of low-skilled labour will become untenable although this 
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